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Statistics, the Law and Title VII: An Economist's View
James Gwartney,* Ephraim Asher,** Charles Hawortht, and Joan Haworthtt
Economic analysis is important to the understanding of the employer/
employee relationship. Employer decisions on hiring, termination, promotion,
and compensation of workers will be determined primarily by economic con-
siderations. Similarly, economic factors will affect the prospective employee's
decision on whether to accept a position, seek employment elsewhere, or demand
higher wages. Labor market outcomes cannot be fully understood without a
working knowledge of the role played by economic forces.
Statistics have long been utilized by economists to identify and measure
economic factors that exert an impact in labor markets. In the Wealth of Nations
(1776), Adam Smith presented wage-rate data on unskilled laborers and skilled
craft workers, noting the importance of qualifications (skills) as a source of wage
differentials among workers. More recently, economists have utilized advanced
statistical procedures such as multiple regression analysis in their efforts to pin-
point the importance of skill-qualification factors. Beginning with Gary Becker's
pioneering work,' economists have utilized statistics to separate earnings differ-
ences caused by skill differentials according to race (or sex) from those resulting
from employer discrimination.
Economics and statistics are important tools available to the researcher
seeking to measure the presence and significance of employer discrimination. It
is only reasonable that they should play a role in legal proceedings concerned
with discrimination. Of course, these tools must be utilized within the framework
of the law. The legal process may exempt certain discriminatory behavior.2 The
legal concept of "discrimination" may not exactly coincide with the economists'
concept of the term. Thus, the law must define and specify the proper role and
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application of economics and statistics in such legal proceedings.
Since the passage of Title VII, the ongoing legal process has been fulfilling
precisely this function-defining and specifying the proper role of economics and
statistics. Unfortunately, very few lawyers and judges receive training in either
economics or statistics. Thus, the application of these tools in Title VII litigation
has sometimes been a painful one.
During this evolutionary stage of Title VII law, ambiguity and confusion have
often been present. We believe that three important Supreme Court decisions in
mid-1977 have made a significant contribution toward the clarification of the law
and the specification of economically relevant statistics in Title VII cases. This
article will review the evolutionary history of Title VII and analyze both the
economic and legal relevance of statistics in this area. Section I focuses on the
economic theory that underlies the use of statistics as an indicator of discrimi-
natory behavior. Section II analyzes the Congressional debate prior to the
passage of Title VII, focusing on Congressional intent. Section III discusses the
momentous Supreme Court case, Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,3 because the am-
biguity implicit in this decision was a source of confusion throughout the 1971-77
period. Section IV discusses the implications of three landmark mid-1977
Supreme Court decisions4 that clarify the proper (and improper) use of statistics
in Title VII proceedings. This section also specifies proper statistical comparisons
that now take on additional importance in light of these key decisions. Section V
discusses the potential relevance of statistical analysis from both economic and
legal viewpoints. The final section summarizes the major findings of the article.
I. Economic Theory, Employee Skill, and Employer Discrimination
The economic considerations underpinning employer/employee decision-
making are more complex than they may appear to the layman. A firm's cost
efficiency and economic survival will be dependent upon its ability to (a) match
job assignments and employee skills properly and (b) establish a wage compen-
sation system that provides an incentive for efficient employee behavior. Given
the importance of employment decisions, they clearly will not be made haphaz-
ardly via random decision-making procedures.
Workers are employed and -compensated by firms because they play a vital
role in the production process. The productive contribution of employees expands
the ability of the firm to produce revenue-generating output. In a market-directed
economy, the employer/employee relationship is based on the expectation of
mutual gain. The employee will not accept a position unless he perceives that the
"job assignment/compensation" conditions are more attractive than the alterna-
tives, including self-employment. Similarly, the employer will not offer the
employee a job unless the employer believes that the worker will enhance the
firm's output (and revenues) sufficiently to cover the cost of employing the
worker. Unless both employee and employer expect to gain, they will not agree
to a voluntary exchange.
3 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
4 The three decisions that relate to the proper use of statistics are: Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); United Air Lines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977); and Hazelwood
School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
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Because of their specialized skills and abilities, some employees will make
a greater contribution to the output of the firm than others. For example, the
contribution of an All-Star first baseman, such as Steve Garvey of the Dodgers,
clearly exceeds that of a less skillful utility infielder who may also be employed by
the Dodgers. Thus, when one makes salary comparisons, one would not expect
the utility infielder to earn the same salary as Steve Garvey. Even though they
may be the same age, work equally hard, and have approximately the same
physical characteristics, employers are not blind to the difference between the two.
Since Garvey is a more skilled player, the Dodgers and other potential employers
are willing to offer Garvey a higher wage than the utility infielder, i.e., one that
is commensurate with his greater skill.
This link between employee skills, contribution to output, and wage rates
is just as significant in other lines of business as it is in professional baseball. More
highly skilled (qualified) employees will be able to command higher wages in the
labor market precisely because they are able to make a larger contribution to the
output of the firm. For example, wage differentials between unskilled laborers
and skilled craftsmen have existed for centuries because the craftsmen consistently
accomplish many assignments more satisfactorily and in less time. Lawyers
indicate their awareness of the skill-wage link when they implement wage dif-
ferentials among employees. For example, receptionists generally earn less than
skilled legal secretaries.
Economic theory explains the precise link that employers who wish to
minimize costs will establish between employee skills and wages. If an employer
is minimizing per. unit costs, an additional dollar spent on unskilled labor must
expand output as much as an additional dollar spent on skilled labor.
Wage differentials among workers possessing different skills will reflect their
relative value to the firm. Further, an employer who wants to minimize costs will
pay skilled labor a higher wage than unskilled labor if, and only if, the marginal
productivity (impact of an additional worker on output) of the skilled workers is
sufficient to offset the higher employment cost.' For example, suppose that em-
ployment of a skilled craftsman increases the output of a shoe manufacturer by
two units, while output can be expanded by one unit if an unskilled laborer is
employed. Under these circumstances, if the wage ratio of skilled to unskilled
labor is less than two, cost will be reduced by substituting skilled for unskilled
labor. Of course, as the employer continues to expand his skilled labor force, the
5 This proposition follows directly from the well-known cost minimization theorem in
economics. This theorem states that the ratio of the price of a factor divided by its marginal
product (i.e., the change in output as the result of employing an additional unit of the factor)
must be equal for all factors. Mathematically, the theorem states that when the firm's per unit
costs of production are at a minimum, the following condition will exist:
P. Pb P.
MP5  MPb MP,
where P = the price of the resource,
MP = the marginal product of the resource, and
ab,c,...,n denote the specific resources employed by the firm
See R. DORFMAN, PRICES AND MARKETS 88-95 (1978) for a detailed proof of the theorem.
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output gains, associated with the employment of additional skilled workers will
fall."
Carrying the hypothetical further, what would happen if the skilled!
unskilled wage ratio were temporarily more than two? If that were the case,
the productivity advantage of the skilled workers would be insufficient to merit
their employment at such a high wage. It would be less expensive for the shoe
manufacturer to hire two unskilled workers, substituting them for skilled workers.
Of course, as the employer continues this course of action, the relative marginal
productive contribution of the unskilled workers will decline as it becomes in-
creasingly difficult to substitute them for skilled workers. This will eventually
bring about a proportional relationship between the skilled/unskilled wage ratio
and the skilled/unskilled marginal contribution to output.
While some may find the mechanics of labor economics technical, the im-
plications of using them are both straightforward and logical. Profit-seeking and
cost-minimizing firms will have a strong incentive to establish a reward structure
that links employee compensation to employee skill (contribution to output). If
other factors are equal, employers who do not closely link compensation and
employee skill (productivity) will experience higher costs and lower profits than
their competitors.
When the skills of employees differ, wage differentials will tend to reflect
the skill differentials. Cost-conscious employers will not pay skilled labor twice as
much as unskilled labor unless the productive contribution of the former is
roughly twice that of the latter. Thus, profit-seeking firms will find it in their
interest to establish a roughly proportional relationship between relative wage
rates and the relative marginal contribution to output for various skill levels of
employees.7 Establishing a reward structure of this type is not merely a matter
of employer preference, but rather a necessary condition for business efficiency
(cost minimization).
In order to implement cost-minimizing employment practices, employers
use information regarding employee skills, productivities, and labor market con-
ditions.8 It will often be difficult for an employer to evaluate the skills and
productive abilities of potential employees accurately. Observation of employee
performance and learning abilities on lower level jobs will often be utilized to
evaluate the suitability of the employee for higher level positions. In addition,
employers will pay heed to the consistency of workers over time, their innovative
6 This declining "marginal productivity" of skilled workers reflects the fact that at first
skilled workers will be assigned to those jobs for which their skill is most crucial. As their
employment expands, the additional skilled employees will be assigned to positions for which
tleir skills are less and less critical to the efficient performance of the task. Thus, their marginal
impact on output will decline as their employment is expanded.
7 It should be noted that an employer who fails to reward the more highly skilled em-
ployees will lose them to a cost-minimizing competitor who will. For example, if highly skilled
employees are twice as productive as lesser skilled employees, when the skilled/unskilled wage
ratio is only 1.5, cost-minimizing employers will offer skilled employees a wage increase so they
can attract additional skilled labor and substitute this relatively cheap (in relationship to its
productivity) resource for the more expensive (relative to its productivity) unskilled labor.
Of course, as the cost-minimizing firms follow this course, their actions will eventually equalize
the wage/productivity ratio between skilled and unskilled labor.
8 Employment decision making is not unique with regard to this point. Generally,
economic and political decisions are made with incomplete information and under uncertain
conditions.
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abilities, and personal traits that retard productivity (e.g., absenteeism or drug
abuse). If other factors are equal, employees who have established a record of
long-term satisfactory performance are more likely to succeed on higher level
assignments than newly employed workers who may prove less dependable over
the long-term.9 Incomplete information, uncertainty as to employee skill level,
and inconsistency of employee performance are all factors which raise the em-
ployer's risk and hence their cost. However, these factors do not change the basic
structural relationship between skills and employee reward. Working within the
limitations imposed by real-world conditions, cost-conscious (and profit-seeking)
employers have a strong incentive to estimate the productive contribution of
employees accurately and to establish a reward structure that reflects the produc-
tive skill level of employees. It is extremely important for researchers and legal
professionals seeking to identify and measure the impact of employer discrimina-
tion on earnings to recognize that the skill-wage link is a necessary condition for
cost minimization.
According to the economic concept of labor markets, employment discrimi-
nation is present when individuals (or groups) that are otherwise similar are
treated differently on the basis of a characteristic such as race or sex.'" In the
absence of employment discrimination, economic analysis indicates that the em-
ployment experience of equally skilled (qualified) blacks and whites will be
similar. Thus, the earnings and promotion rates of equally skilled whites and
blacks will be approximately equal. Similarly, the representation of blacks and
whites among an employer's work force will be approximately equal to their
representation within the labor market pool from which the work force of the
employer is drawn.
Discriminating employers may be willing to hire blacks only at a lower wage
rate or only into certain positions-particularly low-wage, less-desirable positions.
Black employees may have to better demonstrate the prerequisite skills before
they are promoted into upper-level positions. Whites with lesser skills than avail-
able blacks may be assigned to certain positions. Such discriminatory behavior by
an employer will create a racial disparity in earnings, rate of promotion, repre-
sentation among hirees, and in representation within specific occupational cate-
gories of the firm.""...
9 The importance of long-term consistency explains why employers have generally been
quite willing to permit seniority to play a central role in the promotion/job assignment
decision-making process.
10 The logic of this article applies with equal force to employment discrimination on the
basis of race, color, sex, religion, national origin and age. However, for the sake of brevity,
henceforth, we will refer only to discrimination on the basis of race.
11 It is interesting to note that discriminatory behavior on the part of employers will
increase their production costs. If an employer is paying higher wage rates to whites than to
equally skilled blacks, costs would be reduced if the equally productive black employees were
substituted for the higher waged whites. Similarly, if an employer favors less skilled (less pro-
ductive) whites over blacks when assigning workers to a specific position (at an equal wage
rate), the cost of producing any given level of output will rise. See Gwartney & Haworth,
Employer Cost and Discrimination: The Case of Baseball 82 J. FOL. ECON. 873 (1974) for
both a presentation of the theory and empirical evidence that is consistent with it.
12 When general labor market discrimination reduces the earnings of blacks below that of
similarly qualified whites, a nondiscriminating employer paying the same wage to equally
skilled (qualified) white and black workers will attract a disproportionate number of blacks.
Blacks will find the job opportunities offered by the nondiscriminator more attractive than those
available in the general labor market. The opposite will be true for whites. Since the non-
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However, disparate employment outcomes according to race may exist for
another reason. Given the past employment, educational, and training experience
of blacks, the average skill level of the black work force in a labor area (or for
a representative firm) is likely to be lower than the average for whites. If this is
true, the earnings and promotion rates of whites will be likely to exceed the
rates for the less skilled blacks. In fact, cost efficiency would necessarily generate
this outcome, even if similarly skilled blacks and whites received identical treat-
ment.
Differences in employment outcomes according to race may stem from either
differences in the average skill level of white and black employees or employment
discrimination. In order to isolate the impact of employment discrimination,
adjustment must be made for differences between the average skill level ("qualifi-
cations" or "employees merit" in the words of Title VII) of white and black
employees. Unadjusted comparisons will not suffice. Labor economics illustrates
that proper procedures require the researcher to compare the earnings of blacks
and their promotional and hiring opportunities with those experienced by whites
with similar skills. If blacks earned less, advanced more slowly, or were less likely
to be hired than whites with similar skills (qualifications), statistical evidence to
this effect suggests that employer discrimination was present. In contrast, if the
earnings, promotional, and hiring opportunities of blacks were roughly the same
as similarly skilled whites, equal opportunity according to race is implied. It is
important to remember that equal employment opportunity may be present even
though the data show a significant disparity among the respective unadjusted
earnings, promotional patterns, or representation ratios. Skill-adjusted compar-
isons will be necessary before any definitive conclusions can be drawn.
II. Title VII and Congressional Intent
A review of the debate prior to the enactment of Title VII reveals three very
important points concerning the intent of Congress. First, Title VII was designed
to prohibit systematic differential treatment of employees and potential employees
that was based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The legislation was
not directed toward individual complaints or isolated incidents unless they re-
flected the overall pattern and practice behavior of the employer.13 It must be
discriminating employer is unwilling to pay a premium in order to hire whites, his policy will
result in the substitution of blacks for equally qualified, but more expensive, white employees.
If blacks are overrepresented within employment categories relative to the general labor market,
this indicates that the firm is offering blacks more attractive job opportunities than other
employers. Perceiving these relatively attractive opportunities, blacks flow to the jobs offered
by the nondiscriminator at a greater rate than is true for whites. See G. BECKER, supra note 1,
at 31-46, 82-85; and Gwartney & McCaffree, Variance in Discrimination Among Occupations,
S. ECON. REv. 141 (1971) for a rigorous analysis of these issues.
13 Senator Humphrey, a strong proponent of Title VII and the majority whip at the time
of its passage, was abundantly clear on this point:
[A] pattern or practice would be present only when the denial of rights consists of
something more than one isolated, sporadic incident, but is repeated, routine, or of a
generalized nature. There would be a pattern or practice if, for example, . . . a
company repeated and regularly engaged in acts prohibited by the statute. The
point is that single, insignificant, isolated acts of discrimination by a single business
would not justify a finding of a pattern or practice ....
110 CONG. REc. 14270 (1964).
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shown that there has been more than sporadic occurrence of discrimination.
Second, Title VII was directed toward future behavior. Congress did not
intend to hold employers legally accountable for their pre-Act employment
practices, even if they were blatantly discriminatory. The interpretative mem-
orandum placed in the Congressional Record by Senators Clark and Case, the
"bipartisan captains" responsible for Title VII during the Senate debate, stated:
Its (Title VII) effect is prospective and not retrospective. Thus, for
example, if a business has been discriminating in the past and as a result has
an all-white working force when the title comes into effect, the employer's
obligation would be simply to fill future vacancies on a nondiscriminatory
basis. He would not be obliged-or indeed, permitted-to fire whites in
order to hire Negroes, or to prefer Negroes for future vacancies, or, once
Negroes are hired to give them special seniority rights at the expense of white
workers hired earlier.14
This point is vitally important since it illustrates that Congress intended that
"flow" data during the relevant post-Act period would be the decisive factor in
Title VII proceedings. When the structure of data is biased because it reflects
an employer's pre-Act employment policy, its use is inappropriate. Thus, "stock"
employment figures on the representation of blacks among an employer's current
labor force (or specific categories of that labor force) is of little relevance in
Title VII cases when the stock data are also reflective of pre-Act employment
practices.'5
Third, the framers of Title VII did not intend to eliminate employee qualifi-
cations, skill, and merit as valid reasons for disparate treatment. The Act
specifically mentions seniority, employee merit, quantity of work, and quality of
production.' Senator Humphrey pointed out that employers were not only free
to treat persons on the basis of qualifications, but that this was the specific purpose
of Title VII. During the debate Senator Humphrey stated:
14 Id. at 7213.
15 This point is particularly important if an employer's work force has been relatively
static during the relevant post-Act period. For example, if a firm's labor force was comprised
of 1000 whites and zero blacks on July 1, 1965, and 900 of the whites remain currently employed
by the firm, the "stock" employment figures would not be a valid indicator of the firm's post-Act
hiring practices. The proper comparison would be between the representation of blacks among
hirees (the "flow" of employees to the firm) during the post-Act period relative to their repre-
sentation in the relevant labor market pool from which the hirees are drawn. Suppose that
during the post-Act period the firm hired 100 employees, 25 blacks and 75 whites, all of which
are still employed by the firm. If the relevant labor market pool for the firm's hirees was
twenty-five percent black, the representation of blacks among hirees would be exactly as expected,
even though blacks comprise only 25 out of the 1000 workers (2:5%) currently employed by
the firm. Since Title VII was not designed to penalize firms for pre-Act practices, it is the flow
figures, not the stock that are relevant to the determination of whether or not the firm's hiring
practices have been discriminatory. While legal opinions have sometimes been oblivious to this
point, the mid-1977 Supreme Court decisions clearly incorporated it into the law. See Section
IV.
16 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970) provides, in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, it shall not be an unlawful employ-
ment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation or
different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide
seniority or merit system, or a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality
of production or to employees who work in different locations, provided that such
differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate . . ." (emphasis added).
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What the bill does . . . is simply to make it an illegal practice to use
race as a factor in denying employment. It provides that men and women
shall be employed on the basis of their qualifications, not as Catholic citizens,
not as Protestant citizens, not as Jewish citizens, not as colored citizens, but
as citizens of the United States. 17
Clearly, the framers of Title VII did not believe that they were eliminating
racial differences in compensation, promotion rates, and occupational representa-
tion when these disparities reflected the racial (or sexual) differences in the
qualifications, skills, and merit of the individual workers employed by a firm.
An analysis of the intent of Congress suggests that Title VII was designed to
eliminate future employment discrimination. Even though the Act fails to define
"employment discrimination," the specific behavior prohibited and approved by
the Act indicates that the Congressional concept of discrimination was similar to
the concept adhered to by economists. Congress perceived employment discrimi-
nation as differential treatment of otherwise similar workers on the basis of their
race, sex, religion or national origin. Certainly, Congress neither mandated, nor
intended to mandate, that race and sex be substituted for qualifications in the
employment decision-making process. When the qualifications (skills) of blacks
are similar to those of whites, equal treatment is expected. On the other hand,
when the qualifications (skills) of black employees are, on average, lower than
those of whites, Congress recognized that continued racial disparities would be
present. Equal treatment of equals is all that is mandated by Title VII.
III. The Griggs Decision and Title VII, 1971-77
Congress acts but the courts interpret. The specific meaning of Title VII,
like any piece of legislation, will be determined by the evolutionary process of
court decisions rendered in litigation brought under the law.
Personal testimony dominated the initial Title VII discrimination suits
brought against employers. The courts relied heavily upon the subjective testi-
mony of supervisors, personnel officers, charging employees, and fellow workers
as they rendered decisions in Title VII cases during the years immediately sub-
sequent to the effective date of the Act. During this era (1965-70), some im-
portance was attached to whether the employer was thought to have made a good-
faith effort toward compliance with Title VII. With the passage of time, statistics
came to play an increasingly significant role in Title VII litigation, and the courts
have clearly rejected "good faith" as a defense.' Previously, the courts had
utilized statistical evidence in various types of cases charging discrimination in
jury selection, voting eligibility, and school segregation. It was only natural that
statistics would eventually be relied upon in employment discrimination cases.
The Supreme Court's landmark decision in Griggs amplified the role of
statistics in Title VII litigation. In Griggs the Court held that employment prac-
tices "that are fair in form, but discriminating in operation" were prohibited un-
17 110 CoNG. REc. 13088 (1964) (emphasis added).
18 See Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974) ; and Baxter
v. Savannah Sugar Ref. Corp., 495 F.2d 437 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1033 (1974).
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der Title VII. The Court utilized a statistical approach in striking down the em-
ployer's requirement of either a high school diploma or an acceptable score on a
general intelligence test as a condition of employment. Both of these require-
ments, though fair in form, exerted a disparate impact on blacks. The Court
noted that according to the 1960 census, thirty-four percent of the white males
in North Carolina had completed high school while only twelve percent of the
black males had done so. Similarly, the acceptable score on the generalized
intelligence test eliminated a larger percent of black prospective employees than
whites. The Court ruled that the employer's requirements were "artificial,
arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment" which acted to foreclose job
opportunities to blacks.
The Court's apparent intent in Griggs was to prohibit employers from
establishing irrelevant employment credentials that would unnecessarily and
artificially restrain minorities from moving into attractive jobs. In an effort to
accomplish this goal, the Court established the "job-relatedness" doctrine. Three
sentences from the Griggs decision summarize the logic of the Court:
If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be
shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited.
On the record before us, neither the high school completion requirement
nor the general intelligence test is shown to bear a demonstrable relationship
to successful performance of the jobs for which it was used. Both were
adopted, as the Court of Appeals noted, without meaningful study of their
relationship to job-performance ability.'9
On the surface, the job-relatedness criteria appears both reasonable and
harmless. In practice, this is not the case. The problems arise from three sources.
The job-relatedness criteria is (a) legally ambiguous, (b) theoretically unsound,
and (c) economically unreasonable.
It is ambiguous because clear-cut validation procedures designed to deter-
mire whether potentially important skills are, in fact, job related, are generally
inapplicable to a broad cross section of jobs. Of course, industrial engineers and
psychologists have utilized, statistical correlation procedures to validate the job
relatedness of tests for specific, well-defined job tasks. The portion of the Griggs
decision noting that the employer failed to undertake a "meaningful study" of
the relationship between the contested selection devices and job performance
seems to imply that such validation studies constitute the proper vehicle by which
an employer should prove the job-relatedness of an alleged skill factor. For
skills such as the typing ability of a secretary or the mathematical skill of a com-
puter analyst, this would be feasible. However, in the vast majority of cases, it is
not feasible to use validation procedures to prove the link between relevant skills
and an employee's job performance.
For many jobs it is impossible to quantify objectively the performance level
(economists would say productive skill) of employees. How can one quantify
the performance level of teachers, attorneys, supervisors, maintenance workers,
inspectors, librarians, or personal service workers? Workers in each of these job
19 See 401 U.S. at 431.
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categories make an important, even essential contribution to the production
process. Accurate measurement of that contribution for individual workers
however would be either very costly or impossible. But if one cannot quantify the
performance of employees on these jobs, there is no direct method by which im-
portant skill indicators such as previous job-related experience, training, educa-
tion, or absenteeism can be validated as job-related.
A narrow legal interpretation of the job-relatedness criteria becomes a
Catch 22. Racial differences in mean earnings, hiring rates, and promotion rates
cannot be justified via differences in qualifications among whites and blacks,
unless each qualification factor (e.g., educational experience, absenteeism) is
proven to be job-related. But if it is impossible to quantify employee performance
objectively, there is no way that a qualification factor can be validated. The end
result of this vicious circle is the elimination of valid skill qualification factors
from the employment assignment process.2"
The job-relatedness criteria, particularly its narrow interpretation, is the-
oretically unsound because it fails to recognize that most jobs are stepping stones
to other positions. This is particularly true since the employer will have limited
knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of employees at the time they are
hired. It will often be economically rational for an employer to utilize employee
performance on lower level jobs as a means of acquiring information about the
potential skills (and limitations) of workers. In turn, this information will help
the manager who is concerned with cost-effectiveness to reduce his "error rate"
in the selection of workers for higher level positions. Therefore, it is generally
cost efficient for a manager to consider(a) the probability that an applicant will
be able to handle a higher-level job assignment as well as (b) the employee's
expected performance on the lower-level job.
A narrow interpretation of the job-relatedness criteria would require em-
ployers to consider only (b) when they make initial employment assignments.
Employers would not be permitted to consider skills that are relevant to higer
20 Economic analysis illustrates that when team production is utilized, quantification of
employee performance (productivity) is impossible even at a theoretical level. Suppose, for
example, that two men lifted heavy cargo into a truck. In addition, assume that cargo lifting
is a two-man operation. Therefore, neither of the two men would be able to load the cargo by
himself. Under these circumstances, it would be impossible to determine individual produc-
tivities solely by observing the total weight loaded per day. The total output generated by the
team would not be the sum of the output produced by the separable parts (individual workers).
In instances such as these it is impossible even to define individual job performance to say nothing
of validating a qualification factor by illustrating that it is positively linked to job performance.
Team production is often the nature of the production process. For example, the job per-
formance (productivity) of machine operators is generally dependent upon managerial co-
ordination and maintenance operations. Similarly, the job performance (productivity) of
truck drivers is usually linked to the efficiency of other team members such as receiving clerks,
dockworkers, and material coordinators. In each of these cases, since individual output is
affected by the performance of other team members, it would be theoretically impossible to
validate qualification factors.
Of course, inability to validate skill qualification factors in no way implies that they are
unimportant to individual performance on a job. The competency of team members will still
be the vital determinant of their joint output. Managers who seek cost efficiency for their
firms will seek to establish a reward system that encourages employee competency since it is the
vital determinant of total team production. See Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Information
Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AMER. EcoN. REv. 777 (1972) for an excellent analysis
of the link between employee competency, earnings, and the cost efficiency of a productive
team.
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level jobs in the line of progression when these skills are unrelated to the em-
ployee's initial assignment. Thus, an employer hiring a Typist I could not con-
sider such factors as general level of cognitive skills, communication ability, and
shorthand skills if these skills were unnecessary for minimal performance as a
Typist I. This would be true even when the skills excluded from consideration
were highly related to positions in the line of progression above Typist I. When
the employee's performance on an -entry-level job supplies the employer with
valuable information that is relevant to the section of higher-level employees
and/or enhances the ability of the employee to perform higher-level jobs, cost
effectiveness would require that the employer grant some consideration to an
employee's auxiliary skills. This is true, even though the additional ability may
not be essential to performance in the initial position to which the employee is
assigned. A narrow interpretation of Griggs would prohibit employers from
utilizing such cost-reducing procedures.
Even when job performance can be observed, and relevant skill factors could
therefore be validated, cost considerations will generally make such an under-
taking impractical. Employers seeking to validate the job-relatedness of a single
employee characteristic such as an arithmetic test for machinists could expect
to incur validation costs ranging from $20,000 to $100,000. Typically, several
factors such as seniority (on-the-job experience), previous work experience in
related areas, training, cognitive skills, attendance, and health will influence the
job performance of an employee. What would it cost to validate each of these
factors for every job (for which performance could be observed) offered by the
typical employer? The question answers itself. The enormous cost of such a
bureaucratic project would generally rule out its relevance even in areas where
employee performance (productivity) on a job could be directly observed.
A. Ambiguity During the Post-Griggs Era
In the aftermath of Griggs, Title VII litigation was characterized by un-
certainty and confusion. Some lower court judges felt that Griggs required the
employer to provide specific validation data on the job-relatedness of each alleged
skill factor before the skill (or qualification) could be deemed a relevant em-
ployment consideration. Of course, the practical implication of this position was
the virtual elimination of skill qualification factors as a legally valid defense in
Title VII litigation.
Judges favoring this "narrow" interpretation of Griggs imposed the "warm
body hypothesis" on the employment area. According to the warm body hypoth-
esis, all persons who have a warm body are equally qualified. The warm body
approach denies the importance of qualitative degrees of competency.
Obviously, the warm body hypothesis makes a great deal of sense when ap-
plied to such matters as jury selection, voting rights, and school segregation. In
these citizenship areas, gradations of neither qualifications nor rewards are
present. Jurors, voters, and students are either permitted to exercise the rights in
question or they are denied the rights. Once one is qualified, degree of com-
petency is irrelevant.
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Following the narrow interpretation of Griggs, judges have often buttressed
their decisions with precedents initially developed in the citizenship cases. Evi-
dence on statistical disparities played a central role in citizenship litigation. Thus,
judges sometimes extended both the legal precedents and statistical procedures
developed in the citizenship cases into Title VII litigation during the immediate
post-Griggs era.
As a result, legal decisions that implicitly embraced the warm body hypoth-
esis were handed down. For example, defendants were found guilty of discrimi-
nation in hiring because there was a statistical disparity between the percentage
of black applicants and the percentage of white applicants hired by a firm.2 The
qualification differences between white and black applicants were either ignored
or deemed legally irrelevant as a result of Griggs. In other instances, courts
utilized the representation of blacks in the general population (or labor force)
as the bench mark with which to evaluate the representation of blacks in the
employer's work force.2 Of course, if the qualification/skill/occupational mix of
the employer differs from that of the warm bodies in the general population, this
bench mark would be extremely misleading and, statistically speaking, highly in-
appropriate. In still other cases, firms that relied upon managers to select the
most qualified applicants (employees) when hiring (and promoting) employees
were chastized for their failure to (a) supply written, objective instructions to
managers and (b) require the managers to follow these instructions rigidly when
making employment decisions.2' Firms that did attempt to establish objective
criteria had to either (a) undertake the costly (and often impossible) task of
proving that the objective criteria were job-related or (b) run the risk that the
court would eventually rule that the criteria were discriminatory because they
exerted a disparate impact on blacks (or females).4
In other cases, employers were denied the legal right to consider the years of
schooling of employees when making promotion, hiring, and compensation
decisions.' 5 Schooling was deemed an invalid (i.e., nonjob-related) skill factor
21 See Hill v. Western Elec. Co., 12 FEP Cases 1175 (E.D. Va. 1976).
22 Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972) and Davis v. Washing-
ton, 4 FEP Cases 1132 (D.D.C. 1972) provide examples of court decisions which accepted
comparisons that failed to adjust for skill qualifications differentials.
23 See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974); Baxter v.
Savannah Sugar Ref. Corp., 495 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1974); and United States v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971).
24 457 F.2d 348.
25 Of course, the Griggs decision prohibited the use of a high school diploma as a minimum
dducational requirement unless it was validated as job-related. In James v. Stockham Valve &
Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977) the court even objected to the use of years of
schooling completed as an independent explanatory variable in a regression model analyzing the
importance of skill factors as a source of earnings differences between blacks and whites. In this
decision, Justice Wisdom denied the use of years of schooling as a permissible skill factor
because: "(1) as the defendant concedes, education is not a job requirement at Stockham,
and (2) white employees at Stockham have more education than blacks." This reasoning
provides a clear example of the warm body hypothesis extended into the employment area.
Employees are thought to be either qualified or unqualified. If the firm does not have a
minimum educational requirement, then education must not be a valid skill for employment
with the firm according to the logic of this decision. The importance of degree of competency
is completely ignored. If the logic of this decision were strictly applied, even educational
institutions such as Harvard University would be denied the right to use education as a valid
employment skill for a faculty position, since Harvard does not have a minimum educational
requirement. In contrast to this warm body reasoning, most economists would argue that there
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even for workers utilizing advanced technology and employed in plants where
the production processes involved the verbal use of cognitive skills and the ability
to understand written instructions and to communicate instructions to fellow
workers in writing. The denial of years of schooling as a general skill relevant to
a broad set of employment opportunities is even more strange in light of history.
Just a few years earlier, the courts had gone to great length to promote racial
balance partially because of the vital link between schooling and economic
achievement. In Brown v. Board of Education the Supreme Court stated: "In
these days, it is doubtful that any child may be reasonably expected to succeed in
life if he is denied the opportunity of an education."2 Court decisions such as
James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co. seemed to say that when it comes to
employment in our modern technological industries, schooling is really not very
important after all. The inference of the Fifth Circuit's reasoning is that in-
dividuals with, say, a primary school education, are of equivalent value with other
employees who have completed high school-at least for an industrial employer
hiring blue-collar workers.
Such a narrow view infers that literally millions of employers in this and
other countries have been irrationally rewarding employees for their possession
of schooling.." (cognitive skills). This position implies that if employers had fol-
lowed the logic of the Fifth Circuit, they could have saved themselves untold
billions of dollars in wage expenditures by substituting less costly employees with
little education for high school (and college) graduates whose cognitive skills were
largely irrelevant (since they were not validated) to most blue-collar industrial
positions.
In defense of the court's actions during the immediate post-Griggs period,
however, it should be noted that the disparities in the unadjusted data were
often quite large. Similarly, the defense often failed to build an adequate case
illustrating the potential importance of skill qualification factors. Nonetheless, the
impact of a strict application of the job-relatedness criteria of Griggs resulted in
the virtual elimination of skill differentials as a valid defense in the title VII cases
before some courts.
The strict legal interpretation of the job-relatedness criteria of Griggs and
extension of the warm body hypothesis into the employment area was by no
means universal during the 1971-77 period. 7 Many judges rejected this view and
permitted consideration of skill factors as a potential source of racial disparity in
unadjusted data. These procedures were sometimes followed even when the
employer failed to undertake validation studies on the skill factors in question.
In Roman v. ESB, Inc.,2" the Fourth Circuit rejected the plaintiff's attempt
to establish a prima facie case on the basis of a plant-wide average earnings
differential according to color "without regard to differences in level of skill,
is a continuum of educational competency and that on the average, the on-job employee
proficiency would be enhanced by the successful completion of additional schooling, inde-
pendent of whether the firm has a formal minimum educational requirement.
26 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
27 See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1145-96 (1976)
for an excellent summary of legal decisions and the use of statistics in Title VII class action
cases during the immediate post-Griggs era.
28 550 F.2d 1343 (4th Cir. 1976).
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education, and training." The court also rejected the use of unadjusted labor
force representation data as the bench mark by which to judge the representation
of blacks among the defendant's craftsmen, clerical, and managerial workers.
The court proceeded to use statistics on the labor force representation of blacks
within occupational (a proxy for qualifications) categories as the bench mark
with which the defendant's utilization rate of black employees was evaluated.
One of the strongest statements upholding the importance of personal quali-
fications is provided by Justice Hogan's decision in Dobbins v. Local 221,
IBEW.29 The court admonished the plaintiffs for their attempt to utilize raw pop-
ulation data as a guideline by which to judge the representation of blacks among
unionized plumbers, electricians, and carpenters. The court stated:
It is one thing to presume or assume, prima facie-wise or otherwise,
that a significant number of a group have the qualifications for schooling or
voting or jury service. It is another thing to assume, prima facie-wise or
otherwise, that because a certain number of people exist, be they w[hite] or
N[egro]; that any significant number of them are lawyers or doctors; or
merchants, or chiefs-or, to be concrete, are competent plumbers or elec-
tricians or carpenters.3 0
The warm body approach was also clearly deemed inappropriate by the Fifth
Circuit in Hester v. Southern Ry. Co. 3' The court rejected the plaintiff's charge
of hiring discrimination which was based on evidence illustrating that blacks com-
prised a smaller share of the employer's data-typist employees than their repre-
sentation in the general population. In rendering its opinion, the court stated:
"A more significant comparison might perhaps be between the percentage of
blacks in the population consisting of those able to type 60 wpm or better and the
percentage hired into the data-typist position by Southern. 32
As early as 1974 the actions of the Supreme Court in Mayor of Philadelphia
v. Educational Equality League33 implied that the High Court favored a broad
approach to the job-relatedness issue. The case involved a challenge to the
racial composition of the 13-member panel which nominated persons for the
Philadelphia School Board. The Third Circuit, relying on the disparity between
the percentage of blacks on the nominating panel (16%), relative to the per-
centage of black city residents (34%), found that a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation had been established. The Supreme Court reversed this finding, partly on
the basis of the smallness of the sample size on the review panel, but also because
"[t]his is not a case in which it can be assumed that all citizens are fungible for
purposes of determining whether numbers of a particular class have been un-
lawfully excluded."34 Even though the Court indicated that there were job-
29 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968). See also, Louis v. Pennsylvania Indus. Dev. Auth.,
371 F. Supp. 877 (E.D. Pa.), all'd, 505 F.2d 730 (3rd Cir. 1974). In this decision the court
rejected the use of raw labor force representation data as the appropriate baseline with which
to judge the employer's alleged exclusion of blacks from "highly skilled positions . . . such as
editor, publisher or technical writer."
30 Id. at 445.
31 497 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir. 1974).
32 Id. at 1379 n.6.
33 415 U.S. 605 (1974).
34 Id. at 620.
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qualification factors relevant to serving on the nominating panel, it did not
specify what these were. Neither did it provide any evidence (or require evidence)
that the qualifications factors, whatever they might have been, were. job-related.
Thus, the Supreme Court itself moved away from a narrow interpretation of
Griggs in its Educational Equality decision.
B. The Intent of Griggs-A Postscript
With the benefit of hindsight, it is now apparent that the Supreme Court
never intended for the job-relatedness criteria to be strictly applied. It certainly
did not intend for these criteria to be used to eliminate the use of skill (and
qualification) differentials according to race (or sex) as a valid defense in Title
VII litigation. Paradoxically, some of the strongest legal language supporting the
relevance of employee qualifications as a valid employment criteria is contained
in Griggs. In fact, the court even recognized the potential danger involved in the
application of the warm body logic of voting rights decisions into the employment
area. Chief Justice Burger, in delivering the opinion of the court in Griggs,
stated:
[B]ecause of the inferior education received by Negroes in North Carolina,
this court barred the institution of a literacy test for voter registration on
the ground that the test would abridge the right to vote indirectly on ac-
count of race. Congress did not intend by Title VII, however, to guarantee
a job to every person regardless of qualifications.
In short, the Act does not command that any person be hired simply
because he was formerly the subject of discrimination, or because he is a
minority.35
Leaving no doubt about the Court's acceptance of employee qualification as
a valid reason for differential outcomes according to race, Chief Justice Burger
concluded the Court's opinion by stating: "Congress has not commanded that the
less qualified be preferred over the better qualified simply because of minority
origins. Far from disparaging job qualifications as such, Congress has made such
a qualification the controlling factor, so that race, religion, nationality and sex
become irrelevant."'"
Nonetheless, prior to mid-1977 Title VII law was characterized by confusion,
ambiguity and conflicting decisions. Lower courts had a great deal of freedom
to decide which data comparisons were relevant and which skill factors were
permissible (or impermissible because they were not properly validated as job-
related). Some courts rendered decisions embodying a narrow interpretation of
Griggs and the warm body approach. Other decisions incorporated a broad
interpretation of Griggs and permitted the consideration of skill qualification
factors such as prior work experience, training, education, and specialized skills.17
35 401 U.S. at 430-31.
36 Id. at 436.
37 The confusion also generated uneven justice. Firms in areas with "liberal" judges-
those perceived to favor a strict interpretation of Griggs-were far more likely to be charged
with a Title VII violation than employers in areas with "conservative" judges. Responding to
these forces, plaintiffs filed numerous cases in favorable areas, while similar firms in other
areas escaped the litigation costs of Title VII proceedings.
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Not surprisingly, the courts were flooded with Title VII cases, and this was at
least partially because the law was so ambiguous. Inevitably, the Supreme Court
would have to act to clarify the law and reconcile the conflicting views. In May
and June of 1977, the Court moved in that direction as it handed down several
decisions in the Title VII area.
IV. The Use of Statistics: After Teamsters, United Air Lines, and Hazeiwood
The decisions of the Supreme Court in Teamsters, United Air Lines, and
Hazelwood clarified the law and specified several proper and improper uses of
statistics. In the Teamsters decision, the Court outlined the general requirements
of proof imposed on plaintiffs and the significance of rebuttal evidence that might
be introduced by the defense in Title VII class action suits. The Court ruled that
the plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that "unlawful
discrimination has been a regular procedure or policy followed by an employer
or group of employers."3
Representation of proper statistical evidence buttressed by personal testimony
indicating individual instances of discriminatory behavior is the acceptable
method to be utilized by plaintiffs. Isolated incidents and sporadic discriminatory
acts are insufficient evidence to constitute the proof of a prima facie case. How-
ever, during this initial liability stage, the plaintiff "is not required to offer
evidence that each person for whom it will ultimately seek relief *as a victim of
the employer's discriminatory policy." 9
If the plaintiff successfully carries the burden of proof for a prima facie
finding, the burden then shifts to the defense. An employer might defeat the
prima facie showing by illustrating that the plaintiff's evidence was inaccurate,
misleading, or inconsistent with other, more relevant data. Since the focus is on
the pattern of the employer's practices, not individual hiring decisions, statistical
evidence and procedures will be vital to an employer's defense. The High Court
specified that a successful defense against a prima facie case must "provide a non-
discriminatory explanation for the apparently discriminatory result.""0
In Teamsters, the Supreme Court acknowledged two appropriate lines of
defense in a Title VII litigation. First, the Court recognized that the employer
might be able to present statistical evidence demonstrating that "the claimed
discriminatory pattern is a product of pre-Act hiring rather than unlawful post-
Act discrimination."" Second, the employer might seek to illustrate that "it
made too few employment decisions to justify the inference that it had engaged in
a regular practice of discrimination . . ." during the post-Act period.42 While it
was not specifically mentioned, other aspects of the recent Supreme Court de-
cisions certainly imply that the defense might also rebut the plaintiff's showing by
38 431 U.S. at 360.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 361 n. 46.
41 Id. at 360.
42 See Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605 (1974); Boston
Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1974); Chicago Police Officers'
Assoc. v. Stover, 526 F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 1975); Johnson v. Shreveport Garment Co., 422
F. Supp. 526 (W.D. La. 1976); and Shield Club v. City of Cleveland, 13 FEP Cases 533, 550
(N.D. Ohio 1974) for additional evidence on the importance of sample size.
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illustrating that the existing disparities were merely a reflection of racial differ-
ences in employee qualifications (skills) and the employer's reliance upon a bona
fide merit system.
If the employer fails to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case, a trial court
will then conclude that a violation has occurred and that the employer's practices
justify the award of relief. The relief may take several forms, but it must en-
compass the elimination of the discriminatory practices and their effects. When
the individual victim of the discriminatory practice seeks relief, additional proceed-
ings beyond the liability stage must be conducted by the trial court. During these
"remedial stage" proceedings, the proof of the pattern or practice charges con-
stitutes presumptive evidence for the individual claimants. Thus, the burden
rests with the employer who must demonstrate that an individual claimant was
neither harmed nor treated unfairly as the result of his race, color, or sex in
order to eliminate the liability toward the employee during Title VII remedial
stage proceedings.
The 1977 decisions make it clear that statistical evidence will continue to
play a central role in Title VII suits. In Teamsters, the court outlined the logic
behind the emphasis on statistics. After rejecting the argument that statistical
comparisons imply the imposition of quotas which are specifically forbidden under
Title VII, the Court presented its argument as to the relevance of statistical
evidence. Speaking for the majority in Teamsters, Justice Stewart stated:
Statistics showing racial or ethnic imbalance are probative in a case such
as this one only because such imbalance is often a telltale sign of purposeful
discrimination: absent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that non-
discriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a Work force more or
less representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the population in
the community from which employees are hired. Evidence of longlasting and
gross disparity between the composition of a work force and that of the
general population thus may be significant even though section 703(j) makes
clear that Title VII imposes no requirement that a work force mirror the
general population .... [E]vidence showing that the figures for the general
population might not accurately reflect the pool of qualified job applicants
would also be relevant.43
Having duly stressed the importance of statistical evidence, the Court then
proceeded to caution against their inappropriate application. Justice Stewart
stated: "We caution only that statistics are not irrefutable, they come in infinite
variety and, like any other kind of evidence, they may be rebutted. In short, their
usefulness depends on all of the surrounding facts and circumstances."" It is in
the area of clarifying the propef use of statistics that the 1977 decisions will prove
most significant to Title VII litigants.
A. The Relevant Time Period
Currently, Title VII provides a 180-day limitation period for the filing of
43 431 U.S. at 339 n. 20.
44 Id. at 340.
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a discriminatory charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC). Plaintiffs cannot base their case on discriminatory acts prior to the
limitation period for the filing of an EEOC charge. United Air Lines makes this
point clear. The plaintiff, Evans, failed to file a timely charge against United
when her employment was terminated in 1968 as the result of her marriage.
Subsequently, United's practice of terminating female flight attendants upon their
marriage was found to violate Title VII. It was discontinued in November 1968.
In 1972, Evans was rehired by United and she subsequently filed a timely charge
requesting that she be granted the seniority date associated with her initial em-
ployment before it was illegally terminated. The Court rejected her request
because of her failure to file a timely charge within the 90 days then allowed by
the Act. Justice Stevens, speaking for the majority, stated:
A discriminatory act which is not made the basis for a timely charge is
the legal equivalent of a discriminatory act which occurred before the statute
was passed. It may constitute relevant background evidence in a proceeding
in which the status of a current practice is at issue, but separately considered,
it is merely an unfortunate event in history which has no present legal con-
sequences.
45
In the Hazelwood decision, the High Court rejected the probative relevance
of the plaintiff's statistics relating to the defendant's pre-Act employment prac-
tices. The Court ruled that the post-March 24, 1972 period was the relevant
time frame since that was the effective application date of Title VII to public
employers. The Court partially incorporated the language of Senators Clark and
Case, two key cosponsors of Title VII, when it stated:
A public employer who from that date forward made all its employment
decisions in a wholly nondiscriminatory way would not violate Title VII even
if it had formerly maintained an all-white work force by purposely excluding
Negroes. For this reason, the Court cautioned in the Teamsters opinion that
once a prima facie case has been established by statistical work force dis-
parities, the employer must be given an opportunity to show that the claimed
discriminatory pattern is a product of pre-Act hiring rather than unlawful
post-Act discrimination. 46
While the United Air Lines decision involves a single plaintiff, the court's
logic would also appear to apply in class action suits based on charges filed with
the EEOC. Recent lower court decisions have affirmed this principle. Taken
together, the United Air Lines and Hazelwood decisions emphasize the primacy
of the period beginning 180 days prior to the filing of the earliest EEOC com-
plaint, upon which the Title VII claim is based. The United Air Lines decision
points out that when a timely charge is not filed, the actions of the employer
become the legal equivalent of prestatute discrimination. Hazelwood rejects the
45 431 U.S. at 558.
46 433 U.S. at 309.
47 See Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 15 FEP Cases 144 (N.D. Ala. 1977) and Croker v.
Boeing Co., 437 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Pa. 1977). See also Presseisen v. Swarthmore College,
442 F.Supp. 593 (E.D. Pa. 1977) for additional evidence on the importance of the mid-1977
Supreme Court decisions in the establishment of the relevant time period.
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probative relevance of statistics that incorporate the pre-Act behavior of the
employer. Therefore, when a Title VII class action suit is an outgrowth of a
timely charge filed with the EEOC,8 the statistical evidence of primary relevance
will be designed to identify and measure the impact of the defendant's employ-
ment decisions during the period beginning 180 days before the initial filing of
the complaint.
In cases where the plaintiff's statistics are biased because they indirectly in-
corporate the impact of employment decisions made prior to the relevant time
period, the statistics are subject to refutation by the defense. A successful refuta-
tion must illustrate that the pattern of employment outcomes, reflecting decisions
made during the time period beginning 180 days prior to the filing of the charge,
is statistically consistent with equal employment opportunity according to race.
In Hazelwood, the court did point out that statistical evidence on the discrimin-
atory behavior of an employer during an earlier time period (i.e., prior to 180
days before the filing of a timely charge) would be of circumstantial relevance.
The court noted that it might be utilized to support an inference "that such dis-
crimination continued [into the relevant period], particularly where relevant
aspects of the decision-making process had undergone little change." 9
While United Air Lines and Hazelwood emphasize the primacy of the period
beginning 180 days prior to the filing of a charge, the Teamsters decision dis-
cusses the significance of pre-Act (or prerelevant time period) practices that
perpetuate the impact of past discrimination. The court indicated that it would
have followed the argument of Griggs" prohibiting practices which are "fair in
form but discriminating in operation" were it not for the immunity that Congress
supplied to seniority system1s via Section 703(h). Since both the language of
703 (h) and the legislative history of Title VII reveal that Congress intended that
incumbent workers would have the right to exercise fully their accumulated pre-
Act seniority, the court exempted bona fide seniority systems from coverage under
Title VII even when they perpetuate the impact of past discrimination.5
B. "Flow" versus "Stock" Statistics
In the past, courts have often uncritically accepted statistics comparing the
representation of blacks as a percentage of an employer's current work force with
their percentage representation in the labor market (or population) in the area.
If blacks comprise a smaller percentage of the employer's current work force than
they do in the general labor market, this has been accepted as probative evidence
48 If a Title VII class action suit is brought by a plaintiff who did not file EEOC charges,
the relevant time period would begin with the application of the date imposed by the most
relevant state statute of limitations.
49 433 U.S. at 309 n. 15.
50 In Griggs the Court held: "Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on
the face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze'
the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices." 401 U.S. at 430.
51 See 431 U.S. at 345. While the Court did not mention the point, it should be noted
that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970) covers "a bona fide seniority or merit system." Thus, a
bona fide merit system would appear to have the same immunity provided for a bona fide
seniority system via Teamsters, even if the bona fide merit system acted to perpetuate past
discrimination.
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of discriminatory hiring practices. It is important to note that the representation
of blacks among an employer's current work force is determined by (a) the
representation of blacks among hirees and terminatees during the relevant time
period and (b) the representation of blacks among the firm's work force at the
beginning of the relevant time period. Teamsters, Hazelwood, and United Air
Lines each makes it clear that only (a) is of probative relevance.
It is particularly important to rely upon "flow" statistics-data on the
changes that took place during a time period-when an employer's work force
has been relatively static. If the employer has hired (or promoted) only a small
portion of his total work force during the relevant time period, the "stock" or
"csnapshot" statistics may be extremely misleading. 2 The Supreme Court recog-
nized this fact in Hazelwood, and, therefore, remanded the case to the district
court asking it to consider whether the plaintiff's snapshot (stock) evidence was
really probative during the relevant time period or whether it merely reflected
pre-Title VII decisions that were not a basis for liability. By following this course,
the Court reinforced the precedent, initially stated in Teamsters, that "employees
who suffered only pre-Act discrimination are not entitled to relief" and that
employers may rebut a plaintiff's prima facie case by demonstrating that "the
claimed discriminatory pattern is a product of pre-Act hiring rather than unlaw-
ful post-Act discrimination ... "5'
The flow data on persons hired, promoted, or transferred to new areas
provide the evidence necessary for the evaluation of the firm's employment prac-
tices during the relevant time period. The mid-1977 decisions suggest the ap-
propriateness of comparing (a) blacks as a percentage of the total hirees during
the relevant time period with blacks as a percentage of the total labor market pool
from which the hirees are drawn and/or (b) the representation of blacks among
promotees with their representation in the various pools from which the promotees
are drawn. Flow comparisons of this type incorporate the impact of the firm's
employment decision-making during the relevant time period, while netting out
the impact of pre-Act policies.
When making earnings comparisons according to race it is also important to
organize the data in a manner that will minimize the impact of pre-Act discrimi-
nation. Obviously, comparisons between the unadjusted earnings of all black and
white employees would fail to meet this test. 4 Data on the initial earnings of
similarly qualified blacks and whites hired during the relevant time period would
be far more appropriate. This comparison would not be biased as a result of the
firm's pre-Act employment policies. Similarly, data comparing the increases in
earnings of similarly situated and qualified employees during the relevant time
period would be proper. One might also want to compare the incremental
increases in earnings at time of promotion for blacks and whites who received
52 See note 15 supra for an illustration of this point.
53 431 U.S. at 360.
54 The current earnings of employees according to race would reflect (a) earnings rates at
the time of hire for employees hired during the relevant period, (b) increases in the earnings
of employees due to the firm's promotion and/or raise policy during the relevant period, (c)
earnings rates at the time of hire for persons hired during the pre-Act period, and (d) increases
in earnings during the pre-Act period. Both (a) and (b) are probative, while (c) and (d)
are only circumstantially relevant.
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similar promotions during the relevant time period. While the precise com-
parisons of probative importance may vary among cases, the principle remains
the same. The most meaningful comparisons from a probative viewpoint (a)
must fully incorporate the impact of the firm's employment policies during the
relevant time period and (b) must not be biased as a result of the indirect in-
corporation of the pre-Act (or prerelevant time period) employment decisions
of the firm. In general, "flow" statistics are consistent with this principle, while
"stock" statistics are not.5
C. Statistics and the Skill-Relevant Labor Market Pool
When qualifications are a factor in employment, circumstances suggest that
the racial composition of subgroups in the employer's work force and the racial
composition of the general labor market in these same skill qualification subgroups
would be the relevant comparison. When employee qualifications are important,
the general population does not represent the appropriate labor market pool.
Therefore, comparisons between the racial composition of an employer's work
force and the general labor force (or population), even when made for the proper
time period, are misleading and irrelevant to the probative issue.
Following Hazelwood, appropriate use of statistics will require litigants to
compare teachers with teachers,5" typists with typists,"7 and professionals with
professionals" when making work force comparisons between an employer and
the general labor market. Justice Stewart makes this point clear in Hazelwood:
"When special qualifications are required to fill particular jobs, comparisons to
the general population (rather than to the smaller group of individuals who
possess the necessary qualifications) may have little probative value." 9
While pre-1977 Court decisions often gave lip service to qualifications, they
were also sometimes willing to accept comparative statistics based on the warm
body hypothesis, which denies the significance of qualifications. During the post-
Hazelwood era, there has been a decided movement away from the warm body
approach, as lower court decisions have emphasized the importance of making
55 Several lower court decisions subsequent to Teamsters and United Air Lines have em-
phasized the importance of "flow" rather than "stock" data. For example, in EEOC v. duPont,
445 F. Supp. 223 (D. Del. 1978) Judge Stapleton criticized the EEOC's use of statistics that
reflected "pre-Act hirings, promotions and other personnel decisions as well as post-Act ones."
Similarly, Judge Pointer in Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 15 FEP Cases 144 (N.D. Ala. 1977)
refused to rely upon "stock" data illustrating that the variations in the racial composition of
departments was beyond that expected from random "color blind" selection. Judge Pointer
noted:
[Tihe law recognizes the reality of the situation; namely that departments are not
reshuffled anew each year but are, rather the result of past assignments as well as new
ones. Hence, as noted in Teamsters, an employer can overcome the prima facie
effect of such statistics by showing that "The claimed discriminatory pattern is a
product of pre-Act [assignments] rather than unlawful post-Act discrimination."
15 FEP Cases at 147. See also Croker v. Boeing Co., 437 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Pa. 1977) ; and
Presseisen v. Swarthmore, 442 F. Supp. 593 (E.D. Pa. 1977) on this point.
56 In Hazelwood, the Court stated: "The Court of Appeals was correct in the view that a
proper comparison was between the racial composition of Hazelwood's teaching staff and the
racial composition of the qualified public school teacher population in the relevant labor
market." 433 U.S. at 308.
57 See Hester v. Southern Ry. Co., 497 F.2d 1374 (5th -Cihr. 1974).
58 See Roman v. ESB Inc., 550 F.2d 1343 (4th Cir. 1976).
59 433 U.S. at 308 n. 13.
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skill-relevant comparisons. In EEOC v. duPont, Judge Stapleton provided an
articulate explanation for this position. He stated:
The analysis of the statistical evidence must commence with the realiza-
tion that labor market and hiring data cannot be evaluated without reference
to the skills involved. Hazelwood supra. While this seems obvious, it is
ignored by the Government's argument that higher percentages of blacks
assigned to lower level jobs than to higher level ones demonstrates disparate
impact. Statistics showing a higher percentage of blacks assigned to lower
level jobs does not, in and of itself, establish a disparate impact upon blacks.
If the percentage of blacks assigned to the higher skilled jobs is reflective of
those blacks in the labor pool who are qualified to perform them, for example,
the fact that a higher percentage of jobs requiring lesser skills went to blacks
does not indicate disparate impact. °
Following Hazelwood, lower courts have deemed that it is proper to compare
the representation of blacks (or black hirees during the relevant time period) in
the narrowly defined job categories of the employer with the relevant census oc-
cupational categories into which these jobs would be classified." For example,
comparisons are made between the representation of blacks employed (or hired)
by the firm and their representation in the labor force within classifications such
as "painters," "checkers," "secretaries," "stenographers," "typists," and "guards
and watchmen." Such comparisons generally provide a better indicator of the
availability of blacks within specific skill categories.
Comparisons within broad two-digit occupational categories can sometimes
be misleading. Judge Stapleton recognized this fact when he ruled:
Census figures for "professional, technical, and kindred" workers are in-
appropriate for use in evaluating an employer's record in hiring blacks as
professional workers, where census classification includes dozens of groups
whose background bears no relationship to skills required by employer's
professional positions and classification also includes technicians, who are not
classified as professionals in employer's data that EEOC relied on.12
In light of Hazelwood and subsequent lower court decisions, comparative
racial representation flow statistics between an employer's work force and the
labor market within narrowly defined occupational work categories would seem
highly appropriate. Clearly, it is no longer appropriate to rely upon the racial
comparison of the general labor market (or population) as a bench mark with
which to judge the representation of blacks in the skill relevant occupational
categories of an employer's work force.
V. Disparate Earnings, Statistical Analysis, Employee Skills,
and the Job-Relatedness Criteria
When pay rates are a point.of contention in Title VII class action litigation,
the plaintiff will generally present data on-the average earnings of white workers
60 445 F. Supp. at 240.
61 In addition to EEOC v. duPont, 445 F. Supp. 223 (D. Del. 1978), see Croker v. Boeing
Co., 437 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 15 FEP Cases 144
(N.D. Ala. 1977); and Opara v. Modern Mfg. Co., 15 FEP Cases 158 (D. Md. 1977).
62 EEOC v. duPont, 16 FEP Cases 847, 848 (D. Del. 1978).
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compared to the average earnings of black workers. These statistics, which are
not adjusted for individual skills, will typically show that whites have a higher
average income than blacks. This comparison is often supplemented with an
exhibit that illustrates the overrepresentation of white employees in -the highest
paying positions (and pay grades) while blacks are overrepresented in the lowest
paying positions (and pay grades). Statistical evidence of this variety is usually
sufficient to shift the burden of proof to the defense.
Of course, statistics "come in infinite variety and like any other kind of
evidence, they may be rebutted." The defense may rebut the plaintiff's prima
facie case with respect to earnings by illustrating that there is a "nondiscrimi-
natory explanation" for the earnings disparity. 3 If the average skill level of
whites in an employer's work force is superior to that of blacks, the skill qualifica-
tion factor may be a major part of a nondiscriminatory explanation for the non-
skill adjusted earnings disparity. The defense may seek to rebut the plaintiff's
affirmative case by illustrating that (a) blacks and whites within skill or oc-
cupational categories are compensated equally and (b) the overrepresentation
of whites in the higher paying positions is merely a reflection of their greater
availability within these work categories in the relevant labor market. In light of
the 1977 Supreme Court decisions, data on (a) and (b) appear to be highly
relevant.
Supplementary evidence on the importance of skill qualification differentials
as a potential source of earnings or representation disparities is legally germane
and essential to support a defense rebuttal. There are direct methods that can be
utilized to isolate the impact of skill differences according to race as a potential
source of earnings or representation differentials. Simultaneously, these pro-
cedures may also provide an indirect test of "job relatedness" for each potentially
relevant skill factor. Therefore, it is helpful to use a multivariable analysis of the
skill factors as they are related to earnings, promotion or representation. These
techniques may include an analysis of variance in placement or multiple re-
gression analysis to estimate an earnings determination equation after adjusting
for skills which an employee possesses.
Since lawyers and judges seldom have been trained in economics and sta-
tistics, the legal process has, heretofore, failed to appreciate fully the applicability
of earnings determination estimates derived via regression analysis or of analysis
of variance techniques applied to class definitions and representation questions. 4
Of course, a multiplicity of "skill factors" will generally be relevant to the total
evaluation of an employee. Sometimes it will be impossible to fully quantify a
"skill factor." Other times, it will be necessary to use. an indirect indicator to
measure the impact of a factor. For example, in instances where cognitive skills
are important to job performance, years of schooling might be utilized as an in-
dicator of cognitive skills, since data on the latter are not directly available.
Fortunately, many potentially important skill factors are quantifiable. Employee
data are usually available for skill factors such as (a) years of work experience in
63 See 431 U.S. at 360-61 n. 46.
64 There have been some exceptions. See, e.g., Beyond the Prima Facie Case in Employment
Discrimination Law: Statistical Proof and Rebuttal, 89 HARv. L. Rav. 837 (1975); and
Presseisen v. Swathmore, 442 F. Supp. 593 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
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related areas, (b) years of vocational training, (c) seniority (work experience
with current employer), (d) quantity of schooling, (e) quality of schooling, (f)
typing words per minute and (g) indicators of employee dependability (e.g., a
low absenteeism rate). Both economic theory and common sense suggest that
these skill indicators will influence the productive contribution of employees, and
in turn, their earnings, occupational distribution and even their commonality and
typicality under the definition of a class. When white and black workers possess
differing amounts of these skill factors, racial skill differentials are clearly a
potential "nondiscriminatory explanation" of the disparity between the unad-
justed average earnings or representation of white and black employees and may
be helpful in defining a class.
What legally relevant evidence can one derive from an earnings equation
estimated via regression analysis or from an analysis of variance of skill factors?
These techniques provide estimates for the simultaneous linkage between a group
of independent skill indicator variables (e.g., years of experience, seniority, years
of schooling, and absenteeism) and employee earnings or placement (the de-
pendent variable). The statistical evidence from these analyses can be used first
to test whether, after adjusting for skill variables, racial differences in earnings or
representation are still statistically significant.65 The courts have held in Title VII
cases and voting rights cases that a difference which could have occurred by
chance more than 5 % of the time in a racially neutral company is not significant.
Hence, these techniques can provide legally relevant evidence for discrimination
cases.
Variables included in the statistical analysis must be consistent with both
economic theory and legal considerations. Economic theory suggests the ap-
propriateness of variables which are indicators of cognitive and noncognitive
skill levels. However, a variable should not be included when the values of the
skill variable itself may be influenced by employer discrimination.6" The
pertinence of legal issues must also be considered in choosing the appropriate
model. Since the firm is liable only for discrimination during the relevant time
period, it may be most appropriate to focus the analysis on the hirees during the
post-Act time period. Alternatively, one might make some adjustment for permis-
sible pre-Act discriminatory behavior that continues to exert an impact on cur-
rent earnings when both pre-Act and post-Act employees are included in the
analysis. 7
Once an appropriate set of skill factors from an economic, statistical, and
legal viewpoint is identified an economic model of earnings or placement can be
65 The standard statistical test for the significance of a regression coefficient is the t-test.
See P. RAO & R. MILLER, APPLIED ECONOMTmICS (1971) for additional information on regres-
sion analysis and its application to economic data. The 95% level of significance has been
adopted by the courts in several cases. See, e.g., 431 U.S. at 324.
66 E.g., inclusion of employee ratings when the evaluations are carried out by primarily
white supervisors would be highly questionable, since the ratings themselves might be biased
as the result of employer discrimination. Judge Wisdom in James v. Stockham Valves &
Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977), utilized this argument in rejecting the use of this
variable.
67 By way of illustration, when seniority in a specific position (e.g., line driver as in
Teamsters influences employee earnings, if blacks were excluded from this position during the
pre-Act period, it would be permissible to include a variable such as "line driver seniority"
which adjusted for the impact of the permissible pre-Act discrimination by the employer.
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tested to determine its importance as a determinant of employee earnings by it-
self or in conjunction with the other factors. The inclusion of race in the earnings
determination model would also permit one to measure the independent impact
of race (if any) after accounting for differences in skill-qualification factors
among employees regardless of race. Multiple regression analysis may also provide
an estimate of the earnings disparity, if any, after adjustment for the impact of
skill-qualification factors (and permissible pre-Act discrimination if this is
relevant).
It is important to note that cost conscious employers will reward only those
skill factors that are relevant, either directly or indirectly, to the employment
opportunities offered by their firm. Cost minimizing and nondiscriminating
producers will not reward superfluous skill factors that fail to enhance the em-
ployee's productive contribution, and therefore his value to the employer.
An earnings model can be utilized to determine which skill factors are im-
portant (job-related) to the employer" and simultaneously provide a test for
whether the earnings disparity (if any) between black and white employees is
still present after adjusting for these skill factors. The methodology is entirely
consistent with the Griggs decision. If a potential skill factor is not related to
the employment opportunities offered by the employer, the variable will be
statistically unrelated to earnings. In contrast, when statistical analysis illustrates
a consistent link between the skill factor and higher earnings, this constitutes
evidence that the skill factor-is job-related.6"
An example would highlight both the relevance and power of statistical
analysis in Title VII cases. Suppose that a firm which employs unskilled labor,
a broad range of machine operators, and skilled craftsmen is charged with a
violation of Title VII. The average annual earnings of white and black em-
ployees are derived and a white minus black earnings disparity of $200 is dis-
covered. This disparity may stem from skill differences between white and black
employees or employment discrimination. A labor economist is asked to determine
the importance of these possibilities and information is gathered on the skill level
of each employee. Skill variables such as (1) years of work experience with the
employer (seniority), (2) years of schooling completed (cognitive skill and
motivational attributes), (3) years of craft experience with other employers,
68 It must be recognized that the earnings model may not contain only the variables which
the employer recognizes as significant in his employment policy. The employer may fail to
recognize that his reward structure is indirectly compensating any specific skill factor. His
formal pay structure generally will not automatically reward each skill factor that is, in fact,
job-related. The employer may simply be attempting "to hire (and promote) the most
qualified person available at the going wage rate." Nonetheless, if a skill factor is related to
performance, the "most qualified" persons available for hire (and promotion) will, on average,
possess a disproportionate amount of the job relevant skill factors.
69 When data for both blacks and whites are included in the same regression equation, a
spurious (nonjob-related) impact for the skill factor might be obtained if possession of the
skill is related to race. For example, if whites have more manageral experience than blacks
and if whites also have higher earnings than blacks, the estimated positive impact of the
managerial experience variable might be attributable to its link with race rather than its in-
dependent impact on earnings. In order to test if this is the case, the earnings model may be
tested for whites and blacks separately. Consistent links between the skill factors and earnings in
the separate equation model would constitute additional evidence as to the job-relatedness of
the skill factors, independent of race. See Haworth, Gwartney, & Haworth, Earnings, Pro-
ductivity and Changes in Employment Discrimination During the 1960s, AmER. EcoN. Rv.
(March 1975) for additional information on this topic.
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(4) years of operator experience with other employers, (5) rate of absenteeism,
and (6) years of vocational training, are included. Statistical analysis is then
utilized to determine which of these potential skill factors are important to earn-
ings determination, given the jobs and reward structure established by the em-
ployer. Preliminary analysis may well indicate that some of the potential skill
factors are unimportant-that they are unrelated to earnings.
In any case, a model is developed and the following relationships are sup-
ported by the statistical analysis of the company's data.
(1) As seniority increases employee's earnings increase. Furthermore, white
employees have greater seniority than blacks.
(2) When employees who were hired in the same year are compared, those
with less absenteeism have higher earnings than those with higher absentee
rates. Also, if black employees have more absenteeism than whites regardless
of their seniority, the black employees' work habits could affect their earnings
significantly. Our earnings model can determine which potential factors
affect earnings more and whether race is still an important factor after
adjusting for skill mix.
(3) Employees with previous craft experience have a different earnings
model than those without craft experience. Craft experienced employees at
this firm earned 30% more than other employees and experience prior to
employment was significantly more important than education in their earn-
ings determination.
When we employ statistical techniques which adjust for craft experience,
seniority and education, such as in the previous example, we may find that racial
differences are no longer significant. If so, the prima facie case of a significant,
unadjusted earnings difference can be defended as the result of differences in
seniority, education, absenteeism and craft experience, for example, instead of
race.
It is important to remember that cost conscious employers will not com-
pensate employees for skill factors that do not increase employee productivity. For
example, if additional years of craft experience or schooling do not enhance
productivity (employee job performance) a cost conscious employer will not
compensate employees for them. Regardless of whether or not the firm has a
formal wage structure that rewards these variables, if, for example, years of
craft experience (or schooling) and earnings are consistently linked, independent
of race, the statistics support the contention that the skills of employees with more
craft experience or schooling are important determinants of job success for this
firm. 70 On the other hand, if statistical analysis shows no relation between years
of craft experience (schooling) and earnings the result is consistent with the view
that craft experience (schooling) is a nonjob-related skill factor for this employer.
Given the impracticality and infeasibility of strict validation procedures,
statistical techniques such as multiregression and analysis of variance take on ad-
70 This is precisely the point that Judge Wisdom apparently missed in James v. Stockham
Valves and Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977) when he rejected the use of schooling
in an earnings determination model because the firm did not have a formal minimum educa-
tional requirement. See note 25 sapra. The importance of a skill factor is not dependent
upon the firm establishing a formal pay structure that directly rewards the factor.
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ditional importance. Once one recognizes the significance of the underlying
economic theory, it is clear that these statistical techniques offer the courts a
feasible method by which to test for the job relatedness of skill factors. These
techniques are widely accepted and utilized by economists, sociologists and other
social researchers as an appropriate tool with which to measure the importance
of skill factors and determine whether equally skilled persons are granted similar
compensation. Greater applications of these tools in the legal area would merely
be an extension of the work that social scientists have been undertaking for years.
In addition, these statistical tool can be utilized to analyze the significance of
differences in placement, promotional, and occupational distributions, and sup-
port definitions of a class on the grounds of commonality and typicality."' While
incomplete data and insufficient sample sizes may limit their use in some cases,
there is no reason why these valuable tools should not be employed in Title VII
litigation. Using statistical analysis and the associated tests of significance is very
important to an adequate determination of Title VII litigation.72 Having a formal
and nonsubjective way to decide whether factors such as race and skill affect
economic variables systematically is essential in determining whether a pattern
of employer discrimination exists.
VI. Summary
Economic theory is highly relevant to the understanding of labor market out-
comes. Different employment experiences are not always what they appear to be
on the surface. Black and white (male and female) employees may have dif-
ferent employment experiences for reasons other than discrimination and the
framers of Title VII were quite aware of this fact. For example, they did not
intend to eliminate employment outcomes which merely reflect an employer's
"bona fide seniority or merit system."
It is not easy to separate the impact of employer discrimination from the
impact of valid job-related skill differentials. The 1977 Supreme Court decisions
provide Title VII litigants with additional guidelines as to what is relevant (and
irrelevant) in this area. As these decisions relate to the use of statistics, three
important conclusions emerge. First, statistics take on primary significance only
when they focus on the relevant post-Act time period. Statistics from the pre-Act
period are of only circumstantial relevance. Second, statistical analysis should
focus on the "flow" statistics during the relevant time period, since these sta-
tistics will reflect the employment practices at issue between the litigants. In
contrast, stock statistics will be discounted when there is reason to believe that
they are biased as a result of their incorporation of pre-Act (or prerelevant time
period) employment decision making. Third, when making comparisons between
the firm and the local labor market area, apples must be compared with apples.
Probative comparisons must be within similar occupational/skill categories.
71 A charging party must represent claims that are typical of the claims of the class. See
East Tex. Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977).
72 These same issues are often in conflict during compliance review of affirmative action
programs. Consequently, it is helpful to apply these statistical techniques to job grouping
decisions and affirmative action policy.
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While these directions are valuable, economics suggests that exhibits in-
corporating the major guidelines of the Court might be supplemented with
multivariable statistical analysis. This is particularly true when disparate earn-
ings represent a major area of conflict between litigants. Assuming that sufficient
data are available, the statistical approach suggested here should enhance our
knowledge of the interrelationships among skill differences according to race,
-earnings disparities, and employer discrimination. This approach often sheds
light on questions of representation or promotional disparities and on the rele-
vance of various skill factors.
